Edit: "overseas" in place of "oversees" -- and a couple of instances of "it's" where it should say "its." Otherwise, really insightful piece, Gabe. Would love to see it published. Your use of Mann to explain the dynamics of different versions of state power is helpful. I couldn't help but recall James Scott's argument that all such efforts are fool's errands, that even when states have the despot and the infrastructure figured out, they still founder on the waves of local complexities they seek to control. Or at least they can, sometimes. Going forward, it will be interesting to see how the GOP navigates those complexities. Changing demographics are a big one, but of course there are others.
Thanks, Josh! Edited to catch those. It's/its confusions are a longstanding thorn in my writerly paw (hah!), so always good to be reminded on that front.
If any editors see it and want to run it in on their own platforms, I'd be happy to do that, but, for now, I'm keeping it published here ;)
I agree with Jim on most of the bigger picture takeaway--even operations with high infrastructural power run into boundaries--but I contend that Mann's analytics (and many others) are still necessary to distinguish how, when, and why they hit boundaries, and, for that matter, the specific nature of the boundaries they hit. But, absolutely, I don't want to give the impression that I think the state form is either invincible or (on an individuated basis) sustainable. For that matter, Mann's thousands of pages could also be read as a history not only of technai of power, but of their failure and subsequent transformation. But now we're back to dialectics as Steven suggests below!
Right on, Gabe. Thanks. And thanks, too, for putting me on to Mann. I'm definitely going to check out his work in more detail -- though maybe not all 5,000 pages of it :)
Done believing that there is an interaction between material forces and charismatic individuals who express and channel those forces at certain select inflection points make one a liberal? I don't think so.
That's certainly not the only thing or what's *politically and programmatically* substantive (or defining) of liberalism. But I think most materialists (at least among we historians) tend to be wary of explanations that hinge on the personalities of individuals, and, certainly, left critics have been resolutely opposed to treating Trump as an individual exception. I'm one of those left critics; and Trump is continuous with the American political tradition to a great extant in countless ways and not outside or exceptional to it--until he is. How we mark that boundary is contentious and, to an extent, subjective, but it seems like we are approaching it, one way or another.
I agree with your diagnosis, but it seems that a left critics should have a more dialectical rather than straight structuralist explanatory framework, one that can accept some interaction between whole and part in circumstances where the settled grooves of a social system are disrupted. I think we can combine continuity and novelty by saying that he is an intensifying force rather than an exception. Of course, he is an exception insofar as he had no apprenticeship in politics and imbibed none of the formal and informal norms of that realm. That is truly unique.
Well, at the risk of starting a fracas, I'll put Sanders and Nader in the mix as public figures with strong personas and no infrastructure. Were Sanders to be elected as POTUS, he has no caucus to call on …"Hey, write a bill that does X so I can sign it." He may find common cause with a caucus, as he does now. But is he forwarding the interests of the party or himself?
As for Nader, 2000 would have been a great to build a local->state party infrastructure that by now would have seen 10 congressional cycles, 3 complete Senate cycles, 4 presidential campaigns, and all the statehouse/state legs and city/county seats. I'm not saying I blame him for 2000, not when the Brooks Bros Riot is right there. But it would have been something to turn that energy into a viable alternative that would have gotten some local traction and perhaps groomed candidates for higher office who weren't wholly-owned sublets of ALEC. The Communist Party of the USA used to select the candidates for the W State Dems (47 states and the Soviet of Washington was no joke).
The chief problem this country faces is a lack of diversity in candidates, due to the high cost of elections in large part, with the power of incumbency a big driver. So starting small and local, putting every seat in play in every election, is where someone like Nader or Sanders could have used their influence.
Edit: "overseas" in place of "oversees" -- and a couple of instances of "it's" where it should say "its." Otherwise, really insightful piece, Gabe. Would love to see it published. Your use of Mann to explain the dynamics of different versions of state power is helpful. I couldn't help but recall James Scott's argument that all such efforts are fool's errands, that even when states have the despot and the infrastructure figured out, they still founder on the waves of local complexities they seek to control. Or at least they can, sometimes. Going forward, it will be interesting to see how the GOP navigates those complexities. Changing demographics are a big one, but of course there are others.
Thanks, Josh! Edited to catch those. It's/its confusions are a longstanding thorn in my writerly paw (hah!), so always good to be reminded on that front.
If any editors see it and want to run it in on their own platforms, I'd be happy to do that, but, for now, I'm keeping it published here ;)
I agree with Jim on most of the bigger picture takeaway--even operations with high infrastructural power run into boundaries--but I contend that Mann's analytics (and many others) are still necessary to distinguish how, when, and why they hit boundaries, and, for that matter, the specific nature of the boundaries they hit. But, absolutely, I don't want to give the impression that I think the state form is either invincible or (on an individuated basis) sustainable. For that matter, Mann's thousands of pages could also be read as a history not only of technai of power, but of their failure and subsequent transformation. But now we're back to dialectics as Steven suggests below!
Right on, Gabe. Thanks. And thanks, too, for putting me on to Mann. I'm definitely going to check out his work in more detail -- though maybe not all 5,000 pages of it :)
edit: cache when you want cachet…
I find myself in violent agreement with this. Thanks for bringing this into more clear focus.
Thanks for catching that! Corrected.
Done believing that there is an interaction between material forces and charismatic individuals who express and channel those forces at certain select inflection points make one a liberal? I don't think so.
That's certainly not the only thing or what's *politically and programmatically* substantive (or defining) of liberalism. But I think most materialists (at least among we historians) tend to be wary of explanations that hinge on the personalities of individuals, and, certainly, left critics have been resolutely opposed to treating Trump as an individual exception. I'm one of those left critics; and Trump is continuous with the American political tradition to a great extant in countless ways and not outside or exceptional to it--until he is. How we mark that boundary is contentious and, to an extent, subjective, but it seems like we are approaching it, one way or another.
I agree with your diagnosis, but it seems that a left critics should have a more dialectical rather than straight structuralist explanatory framework, one that can accept some interaction between whole and part in circumstances where the settled grooves of a social system are disrupted. I think we can combine continuity and novelty by saying that he is an intensifying force rather than an exception. Of course, he is an exception insofar as he had no apprenticeship in politics and imbibed none of the formal and informal norms of that realm. That is truly unique.
The mirror is the dialectic ;)
ha!
Nice
Sharing as widely as I can, Thank you for this distillation at this time, much appreciated GR. Arohanui from Aotearoa
Well, at the risk of starting a fracas, I'll put Sanders and Nader in the mix as public figures with strong personas and no infrastructure. Were Sanders to be elected as POTUS, he has no caucus to call on …"Hey, write a bill that does X so I can sign it." He may find common cause with a caucus, as he does now. But is he forwarding the interests of the party or himself?
As for Nader, 2000 would have been a great to build a local->state party infrastructure that by now would have seen 10 congressional cycles, 3 complete Senate cycles, 4 presidential campaigns, and all the statehouse/state legs and city/county seats. I'm not saying I blame him for 2000, not when the Brooks Bros Riot is right there. But it would have been something to turn that energy into a viable alternative that would have gotten some local traction and perhaps groomed candidates for higher office who weren't wholly-owned sublets of ALEC. The Communist Party of the USA used to select the candidates for the W State Dems (47 states and the Soviet of Washington was no joke).
The chief problem this country faces is a lack of diversity in candidates, due to the high cost of elections in large part, with the power of incumbency a big driver. So starting small and local, putting every seat in play in every election, is where someone like Nader or Sanders could have used their influence.
2 currents -
globalism vs nationalism
And Christianity vs liberal humanism
I’d argue Trump exploited these 2 trends in addition to many of the typical Republican positions (guns, low taxes, oil)
Typical republicans want globalism
New political alignment coming